[author]步榮根
[content]
新冠病毒（COVID-19）疫情的爆發(fā)極有可能引發(fā)一波針對(duì)中華人民共和國(guó)（“中國(guó)”）、中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨、政治分支機(jī)構(gòu)和相關(guān)官員的訴訟潮，這是中國(guó)之前從未遇到過(guò)的情況。目前已有七起相關(guān)的集體訴訟在美國(guó)提起，之后還會(huì)有更多類似的要求巨額損害賠償?shù)脑V訟。另外，美國(guó)一個(gè)州政府提起了類似訴訟，可能還會(huì)有更多的州仿效。此外，類似的訴訟也很可能在其他國(guó)家出現(xiàn)。雖然該情形史無(wú)前例，但按照以往的相關(guān)經(jīng)驗(yàn)，此類訴訟案件的被告應(yīng)該做好積極應(yīng)對(duì)的準(zhǔn)備。
盡管如此，按照現(xiàn)行法律，針對(duì)中國(guó)政府機(jī)構(gòu)和官員提起的美國(guó)訴訟的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)還是有限而且可控的。在美國(guó)，外國(guó)政府及其分支機(jī)關(guān)、機(jī)構(gòu)或部門均受《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》保護(hù)，享有訴訟豁免。同時(shí)，以公職人員身份行事的官員個(gè)人亦可按照主權(quán)豁免的普通法原則而享有訴訟豁免。
《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》所規(guī)定的特殊送達(dá)程序會(huì)構(gòu)成美國(guó)訴訟申請(qǐng)人面臨的首道障礙，僅等待訴訟開(kāi)始便需花費(fèi)數(shù)月時(shí)間。而且可能在走完其他法定程序之后，原告最終還需要向美國(guó)國(guó)務(wù)院尋求協(xié)助，通過(guò)外交程序完成法律文書(shū)的送達(dá)。在類似案件中，花費(fèi)一年以上的時(shí)間來(lái)解決送達(dá)問(wèn)題并非罕見(jiàn)。
更為重要的是，按照美國(guó)法院對(duì)相關(guān)起訴書(shū)的解釋，這些起訴書(shū)似乎并未提出屬于豁免例外的權(quán)利主張。目前看來(lái)，這些起訴書(shū)多是主張中國(guó)政府在疫情爆發(fā)初期限制醫(yī)生談?wù)撔鹿诓《荆蚴钦`導(dǎo)或未能警告國(guó)際社會(huì)注意疫情。此外，這些起訴書(shū)還不同程度地宣稱一家政府實(shí)驗(yàn)室有可能與最初的疫情爆發(fā)有關(guān)。原告?zhèn)兲岢龅臋?quán)利主張一般都是基于侵權(quán)過(guò)失、重大過(guò)失或者嚴(yán)格責(zé)任。還有一份起訴書(shū)主張違反美國(guó)《反恐法案》，并援引恐怖主義例外對(duì)抗主權(quán)豁免，然而卻未能合理說(shuō)明被告如何實(shí)施恐怖主義行為。盡管《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》允許提出非商業(yè)侵權(quán)索賠，但按照“全部侵權(quán)”規(guī)則，非商業(yè)侵權(quán)索賠可予適用的最常見(jiàn)的例外情形僅限于完全發(fā)生在美國(guó)境內(nèi)的行為。以被告在中國(guó)實(shí)施的被控行為作為部分依據(jù)提出的索賠并不在例外范圍內(nèi)。此外，《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》還禁止針對(duì)涉及“自由裁量職能或責(zé)任”的行為提出侵權(quán)索賠，而“自由裁量職能或責(zé)任”已經(jīng)被做出較為寬泛的解讀，一切帶有判斷或政策因素、但卻不涉及違反法律法規(guī)的行為都屬于這一范疇。
但是，《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》相關(guān)判例法的復(fù)雜程度肯定足以令有創(chuàng)意的法官找到相應(yīng)方式避開(kāi)對(duì)該部法律的常規(guī)解讀，使得相關(guān)訴訟請(qǐng)求得以成立。正如前文所述，有一份起訴書(shū)就援引了《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》的恐怖主義例外，因此相關(guān)原告極有可能會(huì)尋找其他創(chuàng)新方式，避過(guò)主權(quán)豁免限制。對(duì)《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》做出非常規(guī)解讀的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)將會(huì)隨著訴訟數(shù)量的激增而成倍擴(kuò)大。然而，中國(guó)方面可以設(shè)法通過(guò)跨區(qū)程序?qū)⑦@些訴訟合并轉(zhuǎn)交給只有一名聯(lián)邦法官的法院，適用該單獨(dú)的聯(lián)邦上訴法院的法律進(jìn)行審理，從而限制上述風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。
中國(guó)被告在這些訴訟中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更多地取決于美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)的反應(yīng)。目前已有部分國(guó)會(huì)議員聲明支持相關(guān)立法重新定義主權(quán)豁免的保護(hù)范圍，以確保這些訴訟得以向前推進(jìn)。
在上一次美國(guó)遭受的被認(rèn)為與外國(guó)政府有關(guān)的大規(guī)模傷亡事件中，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)便是如此行事。2001年9月11日的恐怖襲擊事件發(fā)生后，多名身份顯赫的原告律師代表9-11恐怖襲擊事件的受害人在多個(gè)司法轄區(qū)提起多起訴訟。這些訴訟聲稱沙特政府、政府所擁有之實(shí)體、擔(dān)任政府要職的沙特王室成員以及一大批沙特私營(yíng)公司、銀行及個(gè)人全都應(yīng)當(dāng)為其通過(guò)伊斯蘭慈善基金會(huì)向基地組織提供的間接資助而承擔(dān)責(zé)任。
沙特政府和政府所擁有之實(shí)體曾兩次因主權(quán)豁免而被初審法院撤銷起訴，但在被提起訴訟的14年后，由于美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)的介入，它們?nèi)缘谌卧谝惶幧显V法院就相關(guān)問(wèn)題展開(kāi)訴訟。一直以來(lái)，媒體上盛傳關(guān)于沙特政府可能資助9-11恐怖分子的猜測(cè)。結(jié)果，原告及其律師成功地說(shuō)服國(guó)會(huì)在2016年通過(guò)了《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》。該法案對(duì)《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》予以修訂，允許就國(guó)際恐怖主義行為造成的損害對(duì)外國(guó)政府提起訴訟。該舉措打斷了因沙特政府最近一次被撤銷起訴而提起的上訴程序，令9-11受害者的代理律所得以繼續(xù)對(duì)沙特政府展開(kāi)起訴。目前，相關(guān)訴訟仍在進(jìn)行之中。
盡管美國(guó)與沙特之間有著長(zhǎng)期的盟友關(guān)系，且?jiàn)W巴馬政府予以阻撓，同時(shí)對(duì)沙特提起的訴訟也缺乏支持證據(jù)，這部法案最終還是得以通過(guò)。奧巴馬政府反對(duì)這部法案的主要理由是，考慮到美國(guó)在國(guó)際事務(wù)上的深度參與，其他國(guó)家也可能考慮頒布國(guó)家主權(quán)豁免原則的例外條款從而給美國(guó)造成一系列的麻煩。由于幾個(gè)月后就會(huì)進(jìn)行2016年換屆選舉，國(guó)會(huì)沒(méi)人愿意為沙特投票而開(kāi)罪9-11事件的受害人，《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》得以在參議院以口頭表決的方式通過(guò)，并在眾議院獲得全票通過(guò)。該提案雖立即遭到奧巴馬總統(tǒng)否決，但總統(tǒng)的否決意見(jiàn)卻因眾議院的大比率反對(duì)和參議院97比1的反對(duì)表決結(jié)果而被推翻。在奧巴馬總統(tǒng)的八年任期內(nèi)，這是唯一一次遭到推翻的否決意見(jiàn)。
中國(guó)是否應(yīng)當(dāng)為新冠病毒的肆虐擔(dān)責(zé)同樣也已成為美國(guó)政界和媒體高度關(guān)注的問(wèn)題。在疫情初發(fā)的幾周內(nèi)，中國(guó)提出的病毒是從武漢華南海鮮市場(chǎng)開(kāi)始傳播的理論在美國(guó)被廣泛接受。但在越來(lái)越多援引美國(guó)政府消息的評(píng)論機(jī)構(gòu)的推動(dòng)下，開(kāi)始有觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為病毒是從武漢病毒研究所或武漢疾控中心泄露而出，據(jù)報(bào)道稱這兩家機(jī)構(gòu)的實(shí)驗(yàn)室都在研究蝙蝠體內(nèi)發(fā)現(xiàn)的冠狀病毒。武漢病毒研究所發(fā)表的研究報(bào)告也引發(fā)了一種觀點(diǎn)，即該實(shí)驗(yàn)室開(kāi)展的實(shí)驗(yàn)實(shí)際上是編制能夠讓人體細(xì)胞感染的病毒。這些指控均遭到中國(guó)主管機(jī)關(guān)和眾多專家的強(qiáng)烈反駁。然而，盡管幾乎沒(méi)有人會(huì)懷疑病毒的出現(xiàn)是個(gè)意外，但是中國(guó)卻越來(lái)越多地遭到關(guān)于對(duì)實(shí)驗(yàn)室疏于管理的抨擊和批評(píng)。
此外，甚至還有更多的關(guān)注點(diǎn)著眼于中國(guó)政府部門為了管控提供給其他國(guó)家和世界衛(wèi)生組織的新冠病毒相關(guān)信息而專門采取的各項(xiàng)行動(dòng)。美國(guó)媒體宣稱，中國(guó)通過(guò)一系列政府機(jī)構(gòu)隱瞞和歪曲與新冠病毒相關(guān)的事實(shí)情況。許多意見(jiàn)認(rèn)為，這種做法極大地延遲了世界各國(guó)本可適時(shí)采取的阻斷和控制病毒傳播的行動(dòng)。作為對(duì)這些報(bào)道的回應(yīng)，美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)參照《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》的模式推出了兩項(xiàng)提案，允許對(duì)參與隱瞞或歪曲新冠疫情危機(jī)相關(guān)事實(shí)的中國(guó)政府官員實(shí)施制裁。
美國(guó)政府對(duì)于本次流行疫情的應(yīng)對(duì)將成為2020年大選的重要關(guān)注點(diǎn)。盡管兩黨對(duì)特朗普總統(tǒng)的執(zhí)政表現(xiàn)會(huì)有不同的意見(jiàn)，但任何一黨都不太可能對(duì)中國(guó)政府的追責(zé)問(wèn)題有所異議。正如美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)曾在大選前夕以壓倒性支持度頒布了《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》一樣，在當(dāng)前的政治環(huán)境下，國(guó)會(huì)很難去反對(duì)由若干共和黨參議員提議的通過(guò)褫奪中國(guó)政府主權(quán)豁免抗辯理由而保護(hù)新冠病毒受害人私人訴訟權(quán)的相關(guān)立法。
當(dāng)然，我們可以辯稱上述舉措并非良策，因?yàn)樗饺嗽V訟并不適合處理?yè)p害范圍如此之廣且更接近于國(guó)家利益的問(wèn)題。此外，相比《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》所采用的程度更為有限的恐怖主義訴訟例外，在侵權(quán)索賠中褫奪主權(quán)豁免是對(duì)國(guó)際慣例的更大程度的悖離。盡管特朗普政府可能不會(huì)太在意這些國(guó)際法原則，但也絕不會(huì)打算將其對(duì)于美國(guó)對(duì)中國(guó)所作應(yīng)對(duì)的控制權(quán)讓與法院和訴訟當(dāng)事人。阿肯色州參議員Cotton近期提出了一項(xiàng)贏得廣泛關(guān)注的立法提案，該法案允許總檢察長(zhǎng)干預(yù)和暫停任何該類訴訟，并允許國(guó)務(wù)院與外國(guó)政府談判可予結(jié)案的訴訟解決方式，而且無(wú)論原告同意與否。盡管這一借鑒自《對(duì)恐怖主義資助者實(shí)行法律制裁法案》的新穎處理方式有可能解決行政機(jī)關(guān)的擔(dān)憂，但其所授予的權(quán)利同樣也可能引發(fā)程序正義和三權(quán)分立方面的問(wèn)題，進(jìn)而導(dǎo)致多年的訴訟。
但是，原告律師不會(huì)等待國(guó)會(huì)做出的進(jìn)一步反應(yīng)。他們還是會(huì)持續(xù)起訴，主張適用現(xiàn)行《外國(guó)主權(quán)豁免法》的例外情形，而中國(guó)方面也需要就此進(jìn)行抗辯。對(duì)于一個(gè)與美國(guó)以及世界經(jīng)濟(jì)存在千絲萬(wàn)縷經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系的國(guó)家而言，應(yīng)對(duì)這些訴訟，外交和政治的溝通自然必要，但如果被動(dòng)放任訴訟的進(jìn)行而無(wú)所作為，或?qū)е氯毕袥Q的結(jié)果。準(zhǔn)備充分有理有據(jù)的有力抗辯，應(yīng)作為中國(guó)的策略性選項(xiàng)。
COVID-19 and Litigation Risk
The COVID-19 pandemic is virtually certain to produce a wave of litigation against the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party of China, and any number of political subdivisions and officials unlike anything China has previously experienced. Seven class actions have been filed in the United States so far, and there will be more, all seeking enormous damages. One state government has also filed suit, and many more are likely to follow. Similar litigation is also probable in at least some other countries. While the situation is largely unprecedented, experience teaches that the entities targeted in those cases should prepare to actively respond.
Under current law, the risks posed by U.S. litigation against China’s government agencies and officials are, however, limited and manageable. Foreign governments and their subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities are protected from claims in the U.S. by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), while individual officers acting in their official capacities are shielded from litigation by the common law principles of sovereign immunity.
The special service procedures required by the FSIA presents an initial hurdle for U.S. claimants that will keep these actions from even beginning for months. It is likely that plaintiffs will ultimately need to invoke the assistance of the Department of State to effect service through diplomatic processes after exhausting other statutory processes. It is not unusual for service issues in such cases to take well over a year to resolve.
More importantly, the complaints do not appear to state claims that are within the exceptions to immunity, as they are currently construed by the U.S. courts. The complaints so far have typically alleged that China’s government censored doctors from speaking about COVID-19 in the early stages and otherwise misled and failed to warn the world community about the disease. They also to varying degrees claim that a government lab may have been involved in the initial outbreak. The plaintiffs’ claims have generally been framed in terms of tortious negligence, recklessness, or strict liability. One complaint claims a violation of the Anti-Terrorism Act and invokes a terrorism exception to sovereign immunity, but does not plausibly explain how any of the defendants committed an act of terrorism. Though the FSIA permits non-commercial tort claims, the most commonly applied exception for such claims limits them, under the “entire tort” rule, to conduct that occurs entirely within the U.S. Claims based in part on the defendants’ alleged conduct in China do not fall within the exception. The FSIA also bars tort claims against conduct that involves a “discretionary function or duty,” a concept that has been broadly construed to include all conduct that involves an element of judgment or policy and does not involve violation of a law or regulation.
There is certainly, however, enough complexity in FSIA case law to create significant risk that a creative judge will find a way around conventional constructions of the FSIA to enable these claims to be pursued. As mentioned, one of the complaints invokes a terrorism exception to the FSIA, and the plaintiffs will likely seek other creative ways around limitations on sovereign immunity. The risk of an outlier construction of the FSIA will multiply with the proliferation of lawsuits. China can, however, limit this risk by seeking to consolidate these actions through the multi-district process into the court of a single federal judge, which will apply the law of a single federal appellate court.
The greater risk for Chinese defendants to these claims may lie in the reaction of Congress. Some members of Congress have already stated their support for legislation to redefine the protection of sovereign immunity to assure that these lawsuits can go forward.
This law was passed despite the longstanding alliance between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, the opposition of the Obama Administration, and the absence of any evidence supporting the claims against Saudi Arabia. The Obama Administration opposed the law on grounds that it would encourage other countries to make exceptions to sovereign immunity, which could cause endless problems for the U.S. because of its extensive international presence. But in the months leading up to the 2016 elections, no one in Congress wanted to cast a vote for Saudi Arabia and against the 9-11 victims. JASTA was, accordingly, passed by voice vote in the Senate and unanimously by the House of Representatives. The bill was promptly vetoed by President Obama, but that veto was overridden by a large margin in the House and a 97-1 vote in the Senate. It was the only veto overridden during President Obama’s eight years in office.
The last time the United States suffered mass injury alleged to be linked to a foreign government, the Congress in fact did just that. After the attack of September 11, 2001, prominent plaintiffs’ lawyers brought multiple actions in several jurisdictions on behalf of victims of the 9-11 attacks. These actions alleged that the government of Saudi Arabia, entities owned by the government, and members of the Royal family who had held high government office, along with a large number of private Saudi companies, banks and individuals, should all be found liable for indirectly supporting al Qaeda primarily through their support for a number of Islamic charities.
Saudi government and government-owned entities were twice dismissed by the trial court on grounds that the claims against them were barred by sovereign immunity, but they were still litigating the issue in the Court of Appeals for the third time 14 years after the suit began, when Congress stepped in. Speculation concerning the possible role of Saudi Arabia in supporting the 9-11 terrorists had remained popular in the media throughout that time. As a result, plaintiffs and their attorneys were able to persuade Congress to pass legislation in 2016, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), which amended the FSIA to permit actions against foreign governments for damages caused by acts of international terrorism. This cut short the appeal from the Saudi government’s latest dismissal and allowed the firms representing the 9-11 victims to continue their lawsuits against it, which are still ongoing today.
China’s responsibility for the spread of COVID-19 has likewise become a matter of intense political and media interest in the U.S. China’s theory that the infection first arose from consumption of animals at the Huanan Seafood Market was broadly accepted in the U.S. during the early weeks of the pandemic. But a growing body of commentary citing U.S. government sources has promoted the view that the virus escaped from either the Wuhan Institute of Virology or the Wuhan Center for Disease Control, both of which are labs reportedly engaged in research of coronaviruses found in bats. Published research from the Wuhan Institute of Virology has also given rise to the theory that the pandemic virus was actually engineered to enable it to infect human cells in experiments conducted in that lab. Those allegations are strenuously contested by Chinese authorities and various supporting experts. But while few doubt that the emergence of the virus was accidental, China is increasingly blamed for inadequate care in the management of these laboratories.
Even greater attention has been focused on the intentional actions taken by China’s governmental authorities to control information about COVID-19 provided to other countries and the World Health Organization. U.S. media claim that China, through a number of government agencies, suppressed and misrepresented facts relating to COVID-19. Many have argued that this substantially delayed actions that could have been taken in countries throughout the world to prevent or contain the spread of the virus. In response to these reports, two bills have been introduced in Congress, patterned on the model of JASTA, that would permit imposition of sanctions on Chinese government officials who concealed or distorted information relating to the COVID-19 crisis.
The response of the U.S. government to the pandemic may become the central concern of the 2020 elections. Though the political parties will have opposing views on President Trump’s performance, neither party will likely be inclined to dispute the culpability of China’s government. Just as Congress enacted JASTA with overwhelming support on the eve of a presidential election, in this political atmosphere, it will be difficult for Congress to vote against legislation, already proposed by some Republican senators, that assures a private right of action for victims of COVID-19 by stripping China of its sovereign immunity defense.
It can, of course, be persuasively argued that this is a very bad idea, since private lawsuits are not well-suited for dealing with a problem that is so broadly damaging and close to interests of state. Stripping sovereign immunity from tort claims in this context is also, of course, a far greater departure from international norms than the more limited exception for terrorism claims adopted in JASTA. Though President Trump’s Administration may be less concerned with these principles of international law, it certainly would not want to cede control of the U.S. response to China to courts and litigants. The proposed legislation gaining the most attention, introduced by Senator Cotton of Arkansas, permits the Attorney General to intervene to stay any action and allows the State Department to negotiate a resolution of the action with the foreign government that can end the case, regardless of whether the plaintiffs agree. While this novel structure, borrowed from JASTA, might answer Executive Branch concerns, its invocation might also present due process and separation of powers issues requiring years of litigation.
Plaintiffs’ counsel will not, however, wait for Congress to act. Complaints will continue to be filed, claiming exceptions to the existing FSIA, that China will need to defend. Although it may be necessary for China to communicate via diplomatic and political channels on these litigations, ignoring the courts and letting these actions proceed without China’s participation may result in default judgments. The preparation of a strong defense to these claims, well grounded in law and factual evidence, should be a strategic option for China.